A psychological perspective on the risks and benefits of positive character evidence. The Jury Expert , 24 4. Cehajic-Clancy, S. Affirmation, acknowledgment of ingroup responsibility, group-based guilt, and support for reparative measures. Diffusion of entitlement: An inhibitory effect of scarcity on consumption. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology , 47 , Reducing exposure to trust-related risks to avoid self-blame. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin , 37 , Moral self-licensing: When being good frees us to be bad.
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From moral outrage to social protest: The role of psychological standing. Bobocel, A. Kay, M. New York: Psychological Press. Niedenthal, P. Representing social concepts modally and amodally.
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Frontiers of social psychology. Embodied temporal perception of emotion. Emotion , 6 , Seeing a fake-news headline one or four times reduced how unethical participants thought it was to publish and share that headline when they saw it again — even when it was clearly labelled false and participants disbelieved it, and even after statistically accounting for judgments of how likeable and popular it was.
In turn, perceiving it as less unethical predicted stronger inclinations to express approval of it online. People were also more likely to actually share repeated vs. We speculate that repeating blatant misinformation may reduce the moral condemnation it receives by making it feel intuitively true, and we discuss other potential mechanisms.
It is not always possible for leaders, teams, and organizations to practice what they preach. Misalignment between words and deeds can invite harsh interpersonal consequences, such as distrust and moral condemnation, which have negative knock-on effects throughout organizations. Yet the interpersonal consequences of such misalignment are not always severe, and are sometimes even positive. Our model integrates disparate research findings about factors that influence how audiences react to misalignment, and it clarifies conceptual confusion surrounding word-deed misalignment, behavioral integrity, and hypocrisy.
We discuss how our model can inform unanswered questions, such as why people fail to practice what they preach despite the risk of negative consequences. Finally, we consider practical implications for leaders, proposing that anticipating and managing the consequences of misalignment will be more effective than trying to avoid it altogether. Did the U. Drawing on theories linking leadership with intergroup attitudes, we proposed it would. Results were reliable when evaluated against four robustness standards, thereby offering suggestive evidence of how historic events may affect gender-bias expression.
We discuss the theoretical implications for intergroup attitudes and their expression. Back to full publication list. When someone expresses prejudice against an outgroup, how negatively do we judge the prejudiced individual and his or her ingroup? We resolve this tension by demonstrating divergent consequences of entitativity for prejudiced individuals versus their groups. Thus, entitativity can grant individuals a license to express prejudice but can damage their group's reputation.
Interdependent Cultures. Failing to practice what you preach is often condemned as hypocrisy in the West. Three experiments and a field survey document less negative interpersonal reactions to misalignment between practicing and preaching in cultures encouraging individuals' interdependence Asian and Latin American than in those encouraging independence North American and Western Europe. In Studies 1—3, target people received greater moral condemnation for a misdeed when it contradicted the values they preached than when it did not — but this effect was smaller among participants from Indonesia, India, and Japan than among participants from the USA.
In Study 4, employees from 46 nations rated their managers.
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Overall, the more that employees perceived a manager's words and deeds as chronically misaligned, the less they trusted him or her — but the more employees' national culture emphasized interdependence, the weaker this effect became. We posit that these cultural differences in reactions to failures to practice what one preaches arise because people are more likely to view the preaching as other-oriented and generous vs.
Study 2 provided meditational evidence of this possibility. We discuss implications for managing intercultural conflict, and for theories about consistency, hypocrisy, and moral judgment. Using a variety of products from socks to clocks to chocolates, we found that participants thought the same amount of money could buy more when it belonged to themselves versus others—a pattern that extended to undesirable products. We tested six mechanisms based on psychological distance, the endowment effect, wishful thinking, better-than-average biases, pain of payment, and beliefs about product preferences.
Only a psychological distance mechanism received support. Our results suggest that beliefs about the value of money depend on who owns it, and we discuss implications for marketing, management, psychology, and economics. This research demonstrates how counterfactual thoughts can lead people to excuse others for telling falsehoods.
When a falsehood did not align with political preferences, this effect was significantly smaller and less reliable, in part because people doubted the plausibility of the relevant counterfactual thoughts. The results reveal how counterfactual thoughts can amplify partisan differences in judgments of alleged dishonesty. I discuss implications for theories of counterfactual thinking and motivated moral reasoning. Not everyone who has committed a misdeed and wants to warn others against committing it will feel entitled to do so.
Six experiments, a replication, and a follow-up study examined how suffering for a misdeed grants people the legitimacy to advise against it. When advisors had suffered vs. Advisors also strategically highlighted how they had suffered for their wrongdoing when they were motivated to establish their right to offer advice. Additional results illustrate how concerns about the legitimacy of advice-giving differ from concerns about persuasiveness.
Hypocrisy occurs when people fail to practice what they preach. Four experiments document the hypocrisy-by-association effect, whereby failing to practice what an organization preaches can make an employee seem hypocritical and invite moral condemnation. The results did not sup- port the possibility that inconsistent transgressions simply seemed more harmful. In Study 4, participants were less likely to select a job candidate whose transgression did vs. The results suggest that employees are seen as morally obligated to uphold the values that their organization promotes, even by people outside of the organization.
We discuss how observers will judge someone against different ethical standards depend- ing on where she or he works. In 4 experiments and a small meta-analysis, we analyzed over 25, cheating opportunities faced by over 2, people. The results suggested that the odds of cheating are almost three times higher at the end of a series than earlier.
Participants could cheat in one of two ways: They could lie about the outcome of a private coin flip to get a payoff that they would otherwise not receive Studies or they could overbill for their work Study 4. We manipulated the number of cheating opportunities they expected but held the actual number of opportunities constant. The data showed that the likelihood of cheating and the extent of dishonesty were both greater when people believed that they were facing a last choice. Mediation analyses suggested that anticipatory regret about passing up a chance to enrich oneself drove this cheat-at-the-end effect.
The data also suggested that the cheat- at-the-end effect may be limited to relatively short series of cheating opportunities i. Our discussion addresses the psychological and behavioral dynamics of repeated ethical choices. Acting virtuously can subsequently free people to act less-than-virtuously.
We review recent. Back to publication list. Entitativity and Intergroup Bias:. We propose that people treat prejudice as more legitimate when it seems rationalistic—that is,. Groups that appear to be coherent and unified wholes entitative groups are most likely to have such interests.
We thus predicted that belonging to an entitative group licenses people to express prejudice against outgroups. Support for this idea came from three correlational studies and five experiments examining racial, national, and religious prejudice. The last four studies found that people were more willing to express private prejudices when they perceived themselves as belonging to an entitative group. Together, these findings demonstrate that entitativity can lend a veneer of legitimacy to prejudice and disinhibit its expression.
We discuss implications for intergroup relations and shifting national demographics. Seven studies demonstrate that threats to moral identity can increase how definitively people think they have previously proven their morality. When White participants were made to worry that their future behavior could seem racist, they overestimated how much a prior decision of theirs would convince an observer of their non-prejudiced character Studies 1a—3.
Ironically, such overestimation made participants appear more prejudiced to observers Study 4. Studies 5—6 demonstrated a similar effect of threat in the domain of charitable giving — an effect driven by individuals for whom maintaining a moral identity is particularly important. Threatened participants only enhanced their beliefs that they had proven their morality when there was at least some supporting evidence, but these beliefs were insensitive to whether the evidence was weak or strong Study 2. Discussion considers the role of motivated reasoning, and implications for ethical decision-making and moral licensing.
This research examined two hypotheses: 1 Reflecting on foregone indulgences licenses people to indulge, and 2 To justify future indulgence, people will exaggerate the sinfulness of actions not taken, thereby creating the illusion of having previously foregone indulgence.
In Study 1 a longitudinal study , dieters induced to reflect on unhealthy alternatives to their prior behavior compared to dieters in a control condition expressed weaker intentions to pursue their weight-loss goals — and one week later, they said that they had actually done less and intended to continue doing less to pursue such goals.